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Information and
Competitive Equilibria in
the Housing Market
Gerasimos T. Soldatos
Abstract
This paper derives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and occurrence likelihood
of competitive equilibria in urban land and housing markets: (i) when there is imperfect information
causing costly search trips and (ii) when land and housing are differentiated according to between-
zone and within-zone heterogeneity. Such competitive equilibria are contingent on the possibility that
consumers spill over into the markets of less preferred zones. The main conclusions are that markets
tend to be partitioned into homogeneous sub-groups and when they do not, heterogeneity may
hamper the effectiveness of search and hence work against the existence of competitive equilibria.
Introduction
Urban land and housing issues have been of
urgent concern since at least soon after the
emergence of capitalism two centuries ago. In-
deed, it is not at all strange that an economics
discipline specialising in such issues should
arise. New Urban Economics is the most recent
attempt to explain and predict the relevant
phenomena. Its development in the late 1960s
brought about almost simultaneously a number
of alternative approaches as well as several
critiques of the New-Urban-Economics model-
ling of urban issues as the outcome of an orderly
competitive process. The purpose of this paper
is to derive conditions under which the results
of a competitive process may be realised even
though the underlying structure of the model is
non-competitive. The specific imperfect infor-
mation which is of particular interest here is the
incomplete information available to prospec-
tive purchasers regarding the non-economic
characteristics of the commodity under consid-
eration.
Such imperfect information is evident, though
not recognised explicitly, in almost every em-
pirical work in housing and renders this good a
heterogeneous one. Take, for instance, the De-
cember 1985 issue of the journal Urban Studies.
There, Abelson tries to explain house and land
prices in Sydney taking into account that there
are differences in accessibility, environmental
circumstances, and in the quality of services
from house or land although there may be no
differences in the price of housing as is the case
for existing and new housing in the long run al-
lowing, of course, for depreciation. McDonald
underlines the importance of expectations re-
garding neighbourhood characteristics in an
examination of the role of expectations in the
formation of urban housing prices in Chicago.
And when Mogridge investigates transport,
land use and energy interaction in London and
Paris, factors pointing to housing heterogeneity
are mentioned, too. Landlord input costs, public
schooling, local taxes, racial or religious dis-
crimination, and crime are some additional fac-
tors that may produce heterogeneity in housing,
ceteris paribus. In sum, any empirical work in
urban housing and land economics cannot
escape reference to the non-economic charac-
teristics of this commodity and these charac-
teristics lead to between-zone and within-zone
heterogeneity and hence, to imperfect informa-
tion, with the consequent information acquisi-
tion costs imposed by market search.
Product heterogeneity and incomplete infor-
mation in the housing sector are simply a 'fact
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Information and Competitive Equilibria in the Housing Market
of life' even though they are not mentioned
explicitly by the empirical literature. The
reason for this omission and superficial, if any,
empirical treatment of heterogeneity is the ab-
sence of theoretical models that would provide
a way of thinking about the relevant issues
analytically. An effort towards this direction is
made here, but it is only the beginning and one
should not expect pathbreaking results. More
precisely, urban land and housing are assumed
to comprise a heterogeneous goods market be-
cause of between-zone and within-zone differ-
ences. Sellers and consumers know this fact
well and act accordingly. Before a consumer
can engage in trading, he or she must carry out
a search process, since information imperfec-
tions are inherent in decision making concern-
ing land and housing. Given that acquisition of
information is costly, if one wants to buy an
apartment or a house, one would first have to
make a few trips to visit different areas, and then
decide according to one's budget and prefer-
ences. This kind of behaviour is typical and
reflects the fact that information is not readily
available. So long as information is costly to
acquire, the likelihood of competitive behaviour
and outcomes becomes even smaller, provided
also that there is an imperfectly competitive
environment.1 Put formally, then, this paper's
purpose is to work out the possibility of competi-
tive equilibria within such a theoretical frame-
work.
The plausibility of this framework derives
from the fact that the relevant market structure
with imperfect information is not perfect com-
petition but rather monopolistic competition,
(Salop, 1976, p240). That seems to be the case
in urban land and housing indeed because
monopolies and oligopolies in these markets
are expected, intuitively at least, to be a rare
phenomenon. This is something the present
analytical environment reflects, thus offering
an alternative to the approaches of Emmanuel
(1985) and Berry (1967). These approaches are
applications of the Chamberlin and Joan Robin-
son versions of monopolistic competition,
respectively, on urban land and housing mar-
kets, but both Berry and Emmanuel assume
away imperfect information and information
acquisition costs. Courant (1978) and Yinger
(1981) do recognise the importance of informa-
tion and proceed to characterise the con-
sequent imperfectly competitive equilibria.
This may be theoretically interesting but of
limited usefulness to the policymaker, since the
relevant issue is the possibility of perfectly com-
petitive outcomes in an imperfectly competitive
environment, rather than the theoretical charac-
terisation of imperfectly competitive equilibria.
Although such an environment can be taken for
granted, its outcomes cannot, and it is these out-
comes which are of concern to the policymaker.
These considerations provide not only an
explanation of why the possibility and implica-
tions of imperfect competition as well as imper-
fect information in urban land and housing mar-
kets have not received the theoretically and
empirically appropriate attention in the litera-
ture, but also the grounds upon which the pre-
sent work has merit. Apart from this work's
novel mental approach vis-a-vis the existing
literature in the modelling of the markets un-
der consideration, it addresses what is for the
policymaker an interesting possibility, within an
analytical framework which tries to be as close
as possible to reality, allowing, of course, for the
necessary mathematical tractability. 'Close to
reality' means that the model recognises both
between-zone and within-zone heterogeneity,
and this in a manner avoiding the presupposi-
tions of the Tiedonic price' (or 'indices') models
that Blomquist and Worley (1981), for example,
mention. This is achieved through the use of the
economics of information and brings the model
closer to Chamberlin without simultaneously
neglecting the benefits one might get out of Joan
Robinson's neo-classicism1.2
In what follows, the next section develops the
formal model and characterises the nature of
competition and competitive equilibria. A third
section formulates, in terms of market structure,
conduct, and seller deviations from the com-
petitive price, the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for the existence of competition in all
markets. The occurrence likelihood of a com-
petitive equilibrium is then investigated
through changes of customer numbers. The
paper concludes with an overview and some
general remarks.
The urban land and housing
market
The decisive factors in the analytical framework
are prices and zones 1 and 2 of the region under
examination.3 There are S1+S2=S landowners
who are assumed to be the decision-makers
concerning urban development and the price
of residential capital. They maximise expected
profits on the basis of price variations that, in
turn, depend only on purchases. There is no
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Housing Studies Vol 5 No 1
advertising whatsoever, and between-zone
heterogeneity emerges due to differences in
inherent zone characteristics, whereas within-
zone heterogeneity arises in connection with
consumer preferences regardless of these
characteristics. As soon as preferences are
independent of economic factors, within-zone
heterogeneity is not such as to result in with-
in-zone market-price differentials and hence
prices reflect only the between-zone hetero-
geneity.4 Letting L, be a minimum land price
cost playing the role of firm's (landowner's)
fixed cost in the ith zone, i= 1,2, lj be a constant
marginal cost, and R, designate, for analytical
convenience, a capacity constraint onfirm size as
a substitute of U-shaped unit construction costs,5
'competitive' prices c^ and c^ per housing unit
are assumed to satisfy the relations
in the way Emmanuel (198S), for instance,
describes. These prices are also assumed to be
related to rents according to some empirical
formula.6
Next, consumers either buy in the ith zone
(but not in both) once in their lifetime, or they do
not buy at all. Consequently, they may be clas-
sified as follows. Letting C^>0 be the number
of non-buyers, C B > 0 the number of buyers, Cjj,
the number of non-buyers that prefer zone i, and
C£ the number of buyers that prefer zone i too,
one obtains
and CN+CB=C=C1+C2
Consumers are aware of the inherent charac-
teristics of each zone and are concerned only
with the within-zone heterogeneity prevailing in
each zone.7 Before a consumer commits himself
to a purchase he makes some search trips to
various firms in order to identify what he is able
and willing to buy. For the sake of mathematical
convenience and simplicity, but without loss of
generality, it is assumed that the number of
'search-trips' or sample size for a non-buyer is
one, ie (1/S), and for a buyer two, ie (2/S). Serious
cost considerations involved in searching may
be a good reason justifying this assumption.
Also, it has often been shown that consumer
search in the housing market is very short.
Now, suppose that at competitive prices, q^
members of O buy in zone i and suddenly, q2
goes up while the price in zone 1 remains at the
q! level. For some members of C2, there will
clearly be a shift from buying in zone 2 to buying
in zone 1, whereas there will be no change in the
behaviour of the members of C1. Of course,
there is a price q2>q2 which is an 'indifference'
price in the sense that the members of C2 who
switched would be simply indifferent in doing
so. By the same token, there is a price
where members of C1 will buy in zone 1 i f ^
while some of them will switch to buying in zone
2 if qi>qi. On the other hand, if there were
no zone differences and all regions had the
characteristics of zone i, the maximum price that
members of C1 and O would pay are q [ and qjP i,j[ = 1, 2, i 4- j , respectively. To contrast these
price levels with their 'competitive' and 'indif-
ference' levels, they might be called 'maximum'
prices. Their difference with any other level
gives a measure of consumer surplus, thus
reflecting consumers' tastes. More precisely, it
is realistic to postulate that q; belongs to the fol-
lowing semi-closed interval: q; e (q;, qj].
Finally, defining s^Sj/S and ^ S ^ , equili-
brium in this model can be characterised by a
market structure or a firm distribution across the
two zones (sj, Sg), a total consumer-firm ratio,
C/S, and a zone-specific price distribution such
that (i) all consumers follow specified buying
policies, (ii) given the equilibrium market struc-
ture, all firms earn zero expected profits, and
(iii) no firm can earn positive profits by changing
its price offer or the zone within which it oper-
ates. These are the conditions for the classical
competitive equilibrium when information is
perfect. Here, however, information is not read-
ily available and consumers can spill over into
the market of the less preferred zone. Given the
effectiveness of search, it is this 'spillover effect1
of imperfect information that requires costly
search trips and the consequent firm behaviour
that finally permit the emergence of a com-
petitive equilibrium (henceforward to be
abbreviated as CE). Such an environment of
uncertainty favours the existence of an exces-
sive number of firms which, in turn, implies an
increased likelihood for zero profits and trans-
actions at competitive prices (q1( q£.
Indeed, the desire to own a home or land is
more or less general while speculation in urban
land and housing markets is not unusual. Fur-
thermore, it is not rare to find people who want
to buy a house or land in some area which they
cannot afford and who follow a second-best
strategy. In contrast, there are people who do
not like an 'expensive' area but because they
can afford it they buy even for the simple reason
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Information and Competitive Equilibria in the Housing Market
of snobbishness.8 Phenomena, then, such as
spillovers and excessive number of firms trad-
ing at competitive prices and realising zero
profits are logical consequences of attitudes.
Intuitively, it should not be strange that under
certain conditions the outcome may be a CE.
Next we proceed to an examination of the con-
ditions under which an equilibrium of this sort
may occur.
Market conduct and the existence
ofaCE
Consider a firm that finds if profitable to deviate
from the competitive price. Then, clearly, an
equilibrium cannot exist and finding the neces-
sary conditions for its existence is now trans-
lated to characterising the conditions under
which deviations from the competitive price are
not profitable. On the other hand, there may be
circumstances where expected demand is not
equal to capacity and entry, and losses or even
bankruptcies become possible. This state of af-
fairs is again inconsistent with an equilibrium
situation and one is able to derive the sufficient
conditions required to ensure a CE by ruling out
such possibilities.9 In this manner, it can be
shown that the necessary condition for the CE
is:]o
Solving for S; and noting that S^O, one may
obtain
(2)
(3)and S=(C^-Ciy(R1-R2)
The interval given by the above inequality con-
tains all possible buyer-non-buyer combina-
tions consistent with a competitive distribution
of firms at equilibrium. Of course, it does not fol-
low that this will always be the case, but the
inequality is indeed the condition for a CE to
occur. Also, the ratio given by (3) shows that the
existence of a CE in both markets requires an
excess of C^ over C^ which has the same sign as
the difference between firm capacities at zones
i and j . No matter how big the difference
between |C^ - C|| and |Rj—R2| may be, an
equilibrium could still occur through adjust-
ments in S[ and Sg provided the constraints of (2)
are fulfilled. For instance, if C|-C^>0 is much
larger than R2—Ri>0, then Sj will decline and
Sg will increase. Intuitively, this means that in
equilibrium, the larger the capacity the higher
the number of customers needed. Note, how-
ever, that in each market, inherent zone advan-
tages in attracting consumers who prefer that
zone, render impossible a complete reversal of
capacity constraint direction via adjustments
in S] and Sa- Put differently, if C£-CJ>0 and
Ri-Rj<0, firms at the jth zone would face a per-
sistent excess capacity.
Next, depending on the relationships
between indifference and maximum prices, a
firm may find it profitable to deviate from the
CE. A deviant firm has several pricing options
that would certainly impose additional con-
straints on the occurrence probability of such an
equilibrium. Suppose that all firms are charging
the competitive price q{ except one at the ith
zone that charges either <% or q- or cjj. That is,
deviant pricing policies are summarised by the
end or middle values of the price sets gener-
ated in the previous section. The reasoning gov-
erning this simplification is that what is true for a
member of a convex set is also true for the entire
set. In this manner, the relationships between
the three prices just mentioned can be used to
determine the profitability of each pricing pol-
icy and hence, the conditions under which a
firm at the ith zone would have no incentive to
depart from the competitive price. These con-
ditions are given by Figure 1 and constitute the
additional constraints on the occurrence proba-
bility of the CE. They provide along with (2) a
set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the
competitive distribution of firms at qx and q2 to
be an equilibrium.
Fig. 1 Conditions under which a firm has no
incentive to depart from CE
Pricing policy Condition*
. ctj L/[R(qrli)]5=2c^sj+cN (4)
. q.XJ, L/[R(q,-li)]S=2cisj+c^ (5)
^ (6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(11)
(12)
*R=s1R1+s2R2: Average capacity under competitive
firm distribution.
cN=C,/C and c£=
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The relevance of spillovers and
search effectiveness
There are many instances that, for various
reasons, a member of Q may make both search
trips to one zone and finally buy in the other
zone. This means that there is a complete spill-
over in the market of the jth zone. Also, a
member of CB may pay one visit to the ith and
the other visit to the jth zone and thus it is poss-
ible that the effectiveness of search may be ham-
pered: the consumer may buy in either zone or
not buy at all. Obviously such circumstances
affect equilibrium. To see how, let first Cg
increase vis-a-vis C^, keeping market structure
constant. The impact on equilibrium would be
different if CB remained constant and shifts
between CB and C | were allowed. Below we
examine each of these cases in turn.
Suppose that Cg increases relative to CN and
that there is a redistribution between Cg and CB
so that CB — c | remains constant and neither c^
nor c^ rises. Then, it can be shown that
as,
- 0 - *
Consequently, even though there are shifts
between C% and CB, and CB increases, R
remains constant. Also the right-hand sides
of conditions (6), (8), (9), (11) and (12) will
decrease because there is no term associated
with buyers and because an increase in cB is
at the expense of cN. This suggests that an
increase in the number of buyers increases the
likelihood for CE occurrence in both zones.
Note that there is no cB term because the profit
maximising price of a deviant firm eliminates all
buyers and the firm sells only to non-buyers. A
reduced number of non-buyers enlarges the
discrepancy between the two sides of the rele-
vant conditions and makes deviation more
unprofitable.
Conditions (4), (5), (7) and (10) contain terms
associated with buyers. The term 2cBSj captures
the dilution in the effectiveness of search, since
the pricing strategy is q;. As soon as the price
of a deviant firm lies somewhere between the
competitive and indifference levels, this firm
retains those members of cB whose effective-
ness of search has been hampered. The simul-
taneous existence of increasing Cg and de-
creasing cN affects the incentives of a firm to
deviate in two opposing directions: the first
makes such a motivation more likely whereas
the latter makes it less likely. Given that Sjand S2
remain unchanged, weighing cB by Sj implies
that the decrease in cN dominates, thus making
deviation unprofitable. This, of course, pre-
sumes that there is no redistribution between
C^ and CN- In any other case, the net effect of
the workings of cB and cN is ambiguous for all
but (8) and (11) conditions. Competition in both
markets now becomes less likely.
Next, suppose that Ri>Rj and consider an
increase in cB that comes entirely at the
expense of cB. Put differently, there are shifts
between C^ and CB while CB, c^, and c^ are
held constant. In this manner, one may obtain
that
<0 and —
acB
>0
That is, Rj>Rj implies that R must decrease.
These derivatives also imply a disequilibrium
where there exists excess demand in the ith
zone and excess supply in the jth zone. Such a
disequilibrium could be eliminated by spill-
overs which, in turn, means that the number of
firms in the jth zone must increase. The equili-
brium consumer-firm ratio is thus lowered and
each firm has fewer expected customers. The
likelihood of CE occurrence is now higher
because expectations for fewer customers and
hence, fewer non-buyers implies that the differ-
ence given by (6), (8), (9), (11) and (12) get
larger. In other words, when there is no term
associated with buyers, the motivation to
deviate is less likely.
In sum, the essence of the results is that in
view of the possibility of less-preferred choices
induced by inadequate information regarding
urban land and housing, a volume of transac-
tions which in practice is equivalent to an ex-
cess number of firms arises, profit margins fall,
and the probability of pricing at cost levels and
hence, the likelihood of the emergence of
purely competitive conditions increases.11
Concluding remarks
This paper presented a theoretical model in
which urban land and housing differ from zone
to zone in two aspects: between-zone and with-
in-zone heterogeneity. The objective was to
examine the conditions for and likelihood of
competitive equilibrium occurrence. Consum-
ers were assumed to be aware of the existence
of land and housing differences among zones,
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Information and Competitive Equilibria in the Housing Market
but they do not know what these differences
are. In order to obtain more precise information,
'search trips' have to be made. Prohibitive costs
and/or other reasons may force a consumer to
search and even buy in a less preferred zone.
Such spillovers, as well as dilution of the effec-
tiveness of search, bring about competitive-like
conditions in a basically imperfectly competi-
tive market.
But while these phenomena are realistic, the
results depend also on the assumption that there
are only two zones and two search trips. A CE
would become less likely if the number of zones
were to increase provided sample size re-
mained constant. On the contrary, increased
search intensity could provide enough observa-
tions and competition would become more
likely. Furthermore, entry and exit have been
assumed away, but allowing changes in market
structures would also guarantee an increased
likelihood of CE occurrence. However, these
changes in the model's results are quantitative
in nature. That is, although the introduction of a
richer information process and/or entry and exit
would enhance the real-world relevance of the
model, the paper's thesis would remain unal-
tered, since all that this extension of the theoret-
ical framework could achieve is to complicate
the mathematics. Similar remarks can be made
insofar as the assumptions regarding advertis-
ing, the number of times consumers buy, and
the possibility of buying in more than one zone,
are concerned. Moreover, the factor of distance
has been completely ignored, though it might
be argued that the extent of market search does
reflect such considerations implicitly, since it is
influenced by transportation matters (eg car
ownership and usage, travel speeds and time
budgets, etc); on the other hand, distance con-
siderations might be thought of as being incor-
porated in the assumption of product hetero-
geneity per se. In other words, the assumptions
this paragraph evaluates are theoretically con-
venient but empirically restrictive: methodolog-
ically, the analysis advanced herein is as useful
as any other theoretical construction pinpoint-
ing in abstract terms a possibility of what reality
might look like.
Indeed, the model as it currently stands is
of little empirical value in the sense that the
mathematical background of the economics of
information is inappropriate for the application
of quantitative techniques. Yet, as soon as intui-
tion suggests that reality is characterised by q
and, hence, by conditions (7) and (10), thus indi-
cating that market structures and outcomes in
urban land and housing are more competitive
than it actually seems -perhaps as competitive
as is the case with farm products - this is of great
empirical and policy significance. It provides
also a major defence for the utilisation of New
Urban Economics, given again that, intuitively,
monopolies and oligopolies in urban housing
can hardly exist in reality. More importantly,
although the empirically restrictive but theoreti-
cally convenient production technology oc-
cupied by the analysis cannot form the basis for
the empirical verification of these assertions
through the quantification of (7) and (10), infor-
mation as to whether <% (including search-
related real estate broker fees and transporta-
tion costs) is the case is obtainable via appro-
priately designed questionnaires. One could
then know, though in this indirect manner,
whether reality conforms with the environment
conditions (7) and (10) imply, provided that the
inequality q ^ q ^ q j has merit only on theore-
tical grounds. Of course, such a possibility
enhances the model's attractiveness, but one
should always bear in mind that the issue of mar-
ket structures and outcomes in urban land and
housing is both theoretically and empirically
quite complicated.
Notes
1
 The market structure of sellers is assumed to be
irrelevant in so far as information acquisition is
concerned.
2
 The mentality governing and modelling of
monopolistic competition is that of Chamberlin,
but the economics of information enable a Robin-
son-type analysis.
3
 The term 'region' denotes the totality of zones.
4
 It has been assumed that there is no advertising.
This does not necessarily imply conditions of per-
fect competition. Inherent zone differences justify
'product differentiation' and hence, a monopolisti-
cally competitive environment even in the ab-
sence of advertising. That is, such an environment
is relevant to the between-zone but not the within-
zone heterogeneity. This can be explained in rela-
tion to the following remark. First, note that buying
alternatives are ranked in the preferences of con-
sumers according to the reality of both between-
zone and within-zone heterogeneity. Also note
that the sheer presence of preference for some-
thing or 'willingness' to buy it, cannot influence its
market and hence, market variables such as
prices, unless 'willingness' is accompanied by
economic 'ability'. Now, matters of economic abil-
ity arise only with reference to inherent zone
characteristics, since within a particular zone, re-
siding, eg half a mile closer to or further from job
location does not justify different prices. There is
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simply another seller waiting a few blocks down
the road. Therefore it is the between-zone differ-
ences that make monopolistic competition poss-
ible and that are reflected by market prices. This
remark explains, in addition, the meaning of the
phrase 'preferences are independent of economic
factors' and the fact that the coexistence of
both kinds of heterogeneity does not imply the
presence of more than two markets.
The terms 'firms', landowners' and 'sellers' are
used interchangeably. The term 'firm' will be used
throughout the text.
The manner according to which rent relates to
price is immaterial for the analysis, but for the sake
of the presentation's completeness, it should be
mentioned that an empirical formula preserves
the distinction between rents, as a flow of pay-
ments, and price, as a once-and-for-all payment.
The restrictive theoretical assumption that prices
are capitalised rents is thus relaxed and the whole
issue becomes empirical in nature.
This is what happens in reality. People have al-
ways a rough idea concerning pollution, school-
ing, etc, differences among areas. Although they
may have to make a site visit to evaluate the extent
of the difference(s), consumers are mainly con-
cerned with within-zone differences because
given the general characteristics of an area, the
most difficult task of consumer search is to locate
the most suitable buying alternative in terms of
distance from schools, view, etc. That is, within-
zone heterogeneity is viewed by consumers as
being in practice greater than between-zone
heterogeneity. Footnote 4 explains why sellers
cannot take advantage of this fact. If they did, each
housing unit would have its own market and condi-
tions of pure monopoly and a 'take it or leave it'
option would emerge. While realistic, such a pos-
sibility is uncommon.
Leibenstein's X-inefficiency refers precisely to
such situations.
Note that these considerations recognise
explicitly that the seller can control the price and
that there can be disequilibria between capacity
and demand. Theoretically, however, the possi-
bility of disequilibrium has to be ruled out if the im-
perfectly competitive environment is to give rise
to perfectly competitive outcomes. These out-
comes can occur by chance and this is why the
analysis refers to the likelihood of their occur-
rence. In other words, we try to identify theoreti-
cally a particular subset of all possible states of the
world: the subset complying with perfect compe-
tition. This is the essence of this work.
10
 Mathematical proofs can be offered upon request.
The particular mathematical mode of the
economics of information followed here is that of
Schwartz and Wilde (1982).
11
 Nonetheless, consumers are still subject to wel-
fare losses due to less-preferred choices.
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